

the suffering (human and non-human) that is under way and will arise from that failure.

This book builds on *International Equity and Global Environmental Politics* (Harris 2001a) and especially *World Ethics and Climate Change* (Harris 2010d), and many of the ideas were first exercised in other books and articles (cf. Harris 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2013, 2016). I am grateful to everyone who commented on that earlier work. I am indebted to Nicola Ramsey for nurturing the first edition and Jen Daly for encouraging the second edition, Michelle Houston for ushering the second edition along and Eliza Wright for serving as desk editor, Barbara Eastman for copy-editing, the Edinburgh University Press Committee for endorsing both editions, Nigel Dower and Heather Widdows (series editors of the Edinburgh Studies in Global Ethics) for seeing merit in the books and for giving me thoughtful advice on how to strengthen them, and anonymous reviewers commissioned by Edinburgh University Press for their comments. As always, I am thankful for support at home, and no little forbearance, from K. K. Chan, not least because research, writing and teaching about climate ethics and justice often leave little time for anything (or anyone) else.

Two central themes in this book are environmental sustainability and individual obligations of global justice. In an attempt to implement the former, the book is printed on paper from certified sustainable sources. To act on the latter, all of my royalties have been directly paid by Edinburgh University Press to Oxfam in support of their work among the world's poor, including those people most harmed by climate change. These are by no means acts of altruism, charity or generosity. They are acts of cosmopolitan obligation in a very fragile – and all-too-frequently unjust – world.

Paul G. Harris
Lantau Island
South China Sea

INTRODUCTION

The ecological underpinnings of the Earth are under monumental assault by human beings. As a consequence, the world is caught in a truly profound dilemma. Decades-long efforts by governments and the international community to cooperate in protecting the global environment have failed to bring about robust action to limit greenhouse gas pollution causing global warming and climate change. While pursuing apparently logical economic and social development, and by acting in ways that are assumed to promote the interests of states and their citizens, humanity continues dangerously to alter the Earth's atmospheric and climate systems, with profound consequences for human well-being and, for many millions of people, even survival. One reason for this tragedy of the atmospheric commons is the preoccupation of governments and societies with political independence and national sovereignty, the dominance of an international system premised on that sovereignty, and a failure adequately to act upon twenty-first-century realities, notably rapidly expanding numbers of new consumers in the developing countries that are adding greatly to the greenhouse gas pollution that has long come from people in the developed countries. The dilemma brought on by this preoccupation with states and their sovereign rights requires an alternative pathway leading to environmentally sustainable development that is agreeable to both rich and poor countries and to their peoples.¹

As part of efforts to find this pathway, this book's project is to explore the role of justice in the world's responses to climate change, and in particular to introduce and explain an alternative strategy for tackling climate change that is more principled and practical than the prevailing doctrine, and that may be much more politically acceptable to governments and citizens than are existing responses to the problem. This alternative strategy is premised on cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan ethic, and its practical implementation in the form of global justice,

offers both governments and people a path to sustainability and successful mitigation of the adverse impacts of climate change.²

The chapters that follow look at the problem of climate change through the prism of global ethics, which can be characterised as 'the exploration of the complex moral values, norms, and responsibilities that we acknowledge in regard to the relations between states and the relations individuals have with one another and the natural world on a global scale' (Dower 2000: 265). The chapters attempt to frame and answer a question posed by Brian Barry (2008: p. ix): 'If we accept the dominant view that each member of the human species has an equal share of the capacity of the earth to absorb carbon emissions, what ethical and policy proposals flow from the "inconvenient truth" that a minority of the world's population (mostly living in wealthy, industrialised countries) are not only using up a disproportionate (and therefore unfair) amount of this resource but are also the major cause and beneficiary of that unfairness?'³ The particular ethic that follows from Barry's question, and the one that informs the book (particularly Part III) and its conclusions, is a global one with two aspects, namely, 'certain values and norms that are universal, in that they are applicable to all human beings everywhere', regardless of the states in which people live, and 'certain duties or responsibilities that are global in scope, in the sense that individuals, states, and other bodies have, in principle, duties towards all others in the world' (Dower 2000: 265).

The global ethic that permeates the book is a cosmopolitan one that assumes all of us to be global citizens in the sense that we are all 'members of one global society, with duties towards one another . . . National borders and identities, therefore, are not of ultimate moral significance' (Dower 2000: 265). I go beyond still important questions of *international* climate justice to explore cosmopolitan or *global* climate justice. I will try to do what Molly Cochran (1999: 21) says that cosmopolitans do: 'seek to interrogate and complicate the value conferred upon sovereign states in the contemporary international system, since cosmopolitans take individuals, not states, to be the starting point for moral consideration.' Thinking in cosmopolitan terms directs our attention to the many millions, and possibly billions, of people harmed by climate change and whose rights to life and well-being are violated by it. Cosmopolitanism also requires us more carefully and explicitly to consider the obligations of the world's affluent people – those who consume the most (usually things they do not need) and generate the most atmospheric pollution per capita – to do much more to address this problem, regardless of whether they live in affluent or poor states. Cosmopolitan justice can locate more obligation to act on climate

change, and to aid those people who suffer from it, in affluent individuals *everywhere*.⁴

Part I of the book sets the stage by describing major practical and ethical challenges of climate change, looking in particular at the causes, impacts and injustices of climate change in the context of broader considerations of how justice does and should obtain in world affairs. Part II of the book is about climate change and *international* justice. It describes and critiques the interstate, communitarian doctrine underlying and guiding ongoing international negotiations and policy responses to climate change. Part III is about climate change and *global* justice. It explores an alternative, cosmopolitan perspective of the problem, in so doing critiquing the routine and increasingly anachronistic preoccupation (even of many cosmopolitans) with people in developed countries.

THE CHALLENGE

Chapter I briefly summarises the monumental problem of climate change, focusing on its impacts, particularly for the world's poorest and weakest countries, communities and people. It describes some of the causes and consequences of climate change and identifies some of the reasons why climate change is a matter of international justice – and injustice. Global warming is causing increasingly significant ongoing climate change that will become profoundly damaging to human well-being in this century and beyond. While all regions of the world will be impacted by climate change, it is the poorest regions and poorest people that will suffer the most. The world's wealthy countries and people will, in most cases, be able to adapt to climate change, or at least to survive it. In contrast, the poorest countries, the poorest regions within them, and the world's poorest individuals, most of them in Africa and developing parts of Asia and Latin America, will suffer and often die as a consequence of climate change. Importantly, those who will suffer the most from climate change – the world's poor – are the least responsible for it. Historically it has been the world's wealthy states and their citizens that have polluted the atmosphere, often as a result of conspicuous consumption and other activities that are not essential to life or happiness (and indeed often undermine them, as when people neglect family and friends to garner wealth and possessions or when they consume foods that are both bad for the environment and bad for their health). Now the burgeoning middle and wealthy classes of the developing world – the world's new consumers – are adding to this pollution, leading to explosive growth in greenhouse gas emissions.

The causes and consequences of climate change raise major practical challenges for societies and governments. They also raise the most profound questions of international and global justice yet encountered in human history. Chapter 2 frames these questions in the context of wider considerations of ethics and justice in world affairs. While communitarian conceptions of ethics and justice largely restrict the scope of our obligations to fellow citizens, cosmopolitan accounts of justice extend those obligations much farther, in the process substantially discounting or even rejecting the moral significance of the states in which people live. But these different accounts of how far the scope of justice should extend do not tell us very much about what is meant by justice, which is a concept subject to different, sometimes competing, definitions. Chapter 2 attempts to define justice sufficiently to understand how the concept is germane, ethically and practically, to climate change diplomacy and policies. In very general terms, justice in this context is about how the benefits and burdens associated with climate change are distributed among states, people and other actors. Drawing on several common accounts of justice (for example, utilitarianism, Kantianism, basic rights), the chapter shows how one can conclude, from a range of perspectives, that climate change is very much a matter of justice, and indeed of *injustice*.

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Chapter 3 describes the concept of environmental justice and the interstate doctrine upon which it has been layered, as governments have sought to address transboundary environmental problems. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the world has been guided by, and governments have sought to reinforce, international norms of state recognition, sovereignty and non-intervention. According to these prevailing and powerful norms, states are the ultimate and most legitimate expressions of human organisation, the venues for morality and the solutions to major challenges that extend beyond individual communities. These norms have so far largely guided discourse, thinking and responses to transboundary environmental problems: international environmental diplomacy, regimes and treaties have been based (almost by definition) on the responsibilities, obligations and capabilities of *states* to limit their pollution or use of resources, and to work together to cope with the effects of environmental harm and resource exploitation. The Westphalian international norms have been so powerful as to result in a doctrine of *international* environmental justice, manifested in the principle of common but differentiated responsibility among states. This

doctrine has guided the creation of many recent international environmental agreements, but states have been noteworthy for the degree to which they have failed to implement it. This is a consequence of the doctrine itself. In the case of climate change, Westphalian norms have stifled diplomacy and prevented policy innovations, fundamentally ignoring the rights, responsibilities and duties of *individuals*.

Chapter 4 describes the international climate change regime and its provisions for international environmental justice. It outlines how the international response to climate change has failed adequately to address the problem. The doctrine of international environmental justice that has emanated from Westphalian norms, discourse and thinking has taken the world politics of climate change in a direction that has been characterised by diplomatic delay, minimal action – especially relative to the scale of the problem – and mutual blame between rich and poor states resulting in a ‘you-go-first’ mentality even as global greenhouse gas emissions skyrocket. The doctrine is one premised on national interests, which in practice routinely translates into national selfishness. The international doctrine has been written into international agreements such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent agreements and diplomatic negotiations on implementing the protocol and devising its successor. Although some major industrialised states in Europe have started to restrict substantially and even reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, these responses pale in comparison to the major cuts (exceeding 80 per cent *or more*) demanded by scientists (UNEP 2014). Indeed, global emissions of greenhouse gases are *increasing*, and will do so for decades to come unless drastic action is taken very soon. This is in large part due to huge emissions increases being experienced in many major developing countries as their economies grow and as millions of their citizens adopt Western consumption patterns. At present, however, emissions from the expanding wealthy classes and new consumers of the world are essentially excluded from the climate change regime because most of the states in which those people live are victims of historical pollution from traditional consumers in the world’s wealthy countries. This exclusion obtains despite the growing impact of this new consumption and pollution on the Earth’s atmosphere.

GLOBAL JUSTICE

One potentially potent remedy to the Westphalian norms that have plagued responses to climate change can be found in cosmopolitan ethics and global conceptions of justice that routinely and explicitly

consider people as well as states. Chapter 5 defines cosmopolitanism and looks at what this perspective tells us about justice in a highly globalised world. A cosmopolitan approach places rights and obligations at the individual level and discounts the importance of national identities and state boundaries. Cosmopolitans recognise the obligations and duties of responsible and capable individuals regardless of their nationality. From a cosmopolitan perspective, what matters are (for example) affluent Americans and affluent Chinese *people*, rather than the 'United States' or 'China' qua *states*. People in one state do not matter more than people in others. Cosmopolitan justice makes demands on capable individuals for a range of reasons, such as the prescription to 'do no harm' (Shue 1995), the historical argument of 'you broke it, you fix it' (Singer 2003), the maxim to 'prevent extreme suffering' (Singer 2003), the belief in the 'ability to benefit others or prevent harm' (Jamieson 1997), the 'priority of vital interests' (Barry 1998) and the concept of not undermining others' capacity to be independent moral agents (O'Neill 1988). Generally speaking, *international* justice views national borders as being the basis for justice. In contrast, *global* justice, while accepting that national borders have great importance in the world, sees them as being the wrong basis for justice. This is especially so in the case of climate change.

Chapter 6 examines perhaps the most important development in the world today: the rise of hundreds of millions of new consumers in a number of developing countries. As recently as the late twentieth century it was possible to talk about climate change, in both practical and moral terms, by exclusively pointing to the responsibility of developed countries and their citizens as the causes of atmospheric pollution and as the bearers of duties to end that pollution, make amends for it and aid those who will suffer from it. The climate change regime, insofar as it recognises this responsibility, is premised on this notion. But the world has changed dramatically in recent decades. The developing countries together now produce over half of the world's greenhouse gases. China has overtaken the United States to become the largest national source of these pollutants. Given the developing countries' large populations, this change does not in itself alter the moral calculus very much because their national per-capita emissions usually remain low relative to those of the developed countries. What has changed, however, is the increasing number of new consumers in these countries, many of them very affluent indeed, who are living lifestyles analogous to, and often superior to (in terms of material consumption), most people in the developed countries. Now numbering in the hundreds of millions, these people are producing greenhouse gases through volun-

tary consumption at a pace and scale never experienced. While many societies in the West are finally starting to make changes that limit and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, the new consumers are going in the opposite direction, with truly monumental adverse consequences for the atmospheric commons. At present, these new consumers face few legal obligations to mitigate the harm they do to the environment, and they have so far escaped moral scrutiny. If solutions to climate change are to be found, this will have to change, not least because 'old consumers' in developed societies will be watching these new consumers do the things that the old consumers are being told they must not do in order to help the world tackle climate change. As long as the new consumers hide behind their states' poverty, practical and politically viable solutions to climate change will be very difficult to realise.

Chapter 7 proposes an alternative to the status quo climate change regime, premised as it is on the rights and duties of states while largely ignoring the rights and duties of too many people. The chapter proposes that cosmopolitan aims should be incorporated as *objectives* of climate change diplomacy and policy. Because cosmopolitanism is concerned with individuals, it can help the world reverse the failed national and international policies that have contributed to the tragedy of the atmospheric commons. It can do this in part by addressing the lack of legal obligations for many millions of affluent people in developing countries to limit their greenhouse gas emissions in any way while still recognising that the world's affluent states, and indeed the affluent people within them, are even more responsible to do so. Cosmopolitan justice points us to a fundamental conclusion: that affluent people *everywhere* should limit, and more often than not cut, their atmospheric pollution, regardless of where they live. This points to a cosmopolitan corollary to the doctrine of interstate justice, one that explicitly acknowledges and acts upon the duties of all affluent people, regardless of nationality, to be good global citizens. The cosmopolitan corollary comprises a new form of international discourse, a new set of assumptions about what states and their citizens should be aiming for, and a new kind of institutionalism that folds global ethics and justice into the practice of states. This corollary is more principled, more practical and indeed more politically viable than current doctrine and norms of international environmental justice applied to climate change.

The book concludes in Chapter 8 by briefly looking at the importance of global citizenship and personal responsibility for actualising global environmental justice. The cosmopolitan corollary to international justice offers an escape from the legal and mental straitjacket of

Westphalian norms. By associating the pollution of individuals and classes of people with ethical diplomatic arguments, international agreements and the domestic policies intended for implementation of those agreements, governments of both developed and developing states can escape the ongoing blame game in which poor states blame rich ones for the problem's creation, and rich states blame poor ones for the problem's future trajectory – with both refusing sufficiently to obligate even their affluent citizens to do all that is necessary and just. In the context of climate change, cosmopolitan justice has the potential to define a pathway whereby major developing-country governments can simultaneously assert and defend their well-justified arguments rejecting *national* climate change-related obligations while also acknowledging and regulating growing pollution among significant segments of their populations. This in turn can help to neutralise the reticence of most developed-country governments and their publics to live up to their states' obligations finally to undertake the major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions that will be required to limit future damage to the atmospheric commons upon which all states and all people depend. The cosmopolitan corollary can also help to free up new financial resources to aid those people most harmed by climate change. The conclusion we are left with is that global justice is almost certainly unavoidable if climate change is to be addressed effectively any time soon.

SOME CAVEATS ON THE CONTENTS

I will not be spending much time debating, as philosophers do, the merits of many different ethical perspectives. Following Simon Caney (2005b: 16–17) to some extent, while I do introduce a number of cosmopolitan thinkers and traditions of thought, I focus on arguments that shed light on or support a particular course of action. I do not undertake to present a complete review of literature on climate justice, although readers will get some of that from the book as a whole. As such, the book is meant to be both an introduction to climate change and related questions of justice, and an attempt to craft a proposal for more effective policy action. While philosophers may be reluctant to accept it, the concepts of right and wrong in the real world of international politics are seldom based on philosophical minutiae. Instead, they are based (by my reckoning, at least) on broad, relatively clear and straightforward concepts and arguments.

This is where international politics comes in. One aim here is to advocate a cosmopolitan theme for international politics. I will not be arguing strongly for global cosmopolitan democracy or world govern-

ment – although they may be good ideas and ultimately what we need to combat climate change effectively (see Heater 1996). Instead, my aim is to show how cosmopolitan ethics are *practical and politically viable* in the context of climate change, and how global justice is possibly the most *realistic* route to a new climate change regime that tackles this problem in the forceful way that is required. I follow Nigel Dower (2007: 5), drawing upon normative theory to give 'a defence of an ethic for individuals in which the global dimension of responsibility is significant'. This is, by definition, a cosmopolitan argument, albeit one applied to relations among people and among states.

The argument here is fundamentally a cosmopolitan one because it assumes and attempts to support the contention that taking all people everywhere to be of equal moral worth, and basing climate change policies within and among states on the premise that people are equal in this sense, are the best ways to break out of the too-little, too-late approaches to climate change that the world has mustered to date. I do not attempt to present in detail, nor do I defend strongly, any particular cosmopolitan response to climate change. I review the philosophical literature selectively to help establish the case for a new type of climate policy. This will come as a disappointment to some philosophers who would prefer a very carefully crafted argument free of contradictions. So would I, but in the real world of politics, and probably most of all in *international* politics, contradictions are the norm. If policy-makers, diplomats, parliamentarians, activists and not-so-activist people are persuaded by my formulation of an alternative approach to tackling global climate change, I will be successful. If philosophers also see merit in what is here, all the better. My point is that there is a rough convergence from the perspective of many ethical theories on what needs to be done differently, especially by individuals. This has important implications for international politics and for the policies of states.

My argument in favour of a more cosmopolitan approach to dealing with climate change is not meant to be an idealistic exercise or an act of imploring the world to come around to the view that all people will soon feel that they are global citizens or that states can be abandoned. Rather, this is an attempt to show that the most practical and politically viable approach to climate change – as well as the most principled one – is in fact one that actualises cosmopolitan ethics, and more often than not can be and should be premised upon those same ethics. Dower (1997: 561–2) points to three considerations in world ethics: theoretical, normative and what we might call practical (that is, the application of norms). While theory and normative prescriptions are invoked here,

ultimately my subject is the latter: it is about *practical* ethics, not idealistic or utopian visions and hopes.

This book is also not a philosophical treatise on justice generally or environmental justice in particular. It is not an attempt to argue in favour of one definition of justice over another. And it is not an attempt to repeat or affirm particular arguments for or against climate change justice made by other writers, although there will be some of this. Instead, the book is an attempt to show that justice must be part of the response to climate change, as others and I have argued and as the climate change regime recognises, but that the way that justice has been included in the climate change regime has not helped to solve the problem. In particular, this book is about the failure of the discourse and the practice of *international* justice. It is about an alternative approach to justice, premised on cosmopolitan considerations, that can provide more principled, practical and politically agreeable solutions for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Global ethics and *global* justice are the most realistic foundations for climate change diplomacy and policies.

CONCLUSION

The bulk of literature on justice and climate change, and all related international legal instruments, speak of obligations of *states* to act (or not) to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases, or to act in ways to mitigate the effects of these emissions, and to assist poorer states to help them develop in less polluting ways. There is much less discussion – and what debate we have is largely among philosophers and activists, not diplomats – about the obligations of *individuals*. Increasingly, however, individuals matter: more and more of them who are not now subject to any climate-related obligations are able to afford lifestyles that lead to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. This is especially true given the very rapid increase in the numbers of affluent people in the developing world, most prominently in China and India. As Bradley Parks and Timmons Roberts (2006: 345) remark, ‘climate scientists can barely fathom a world in which the families of China and India will drive their own cars’. But that is exactly the world that is emerging. In China alone, hundreds of millions of people are quite rapidly adopting Western consumerist lifestyles. The climate change regime still fails to integrate this new reality. Thus a central theme of the chapters to follow is that something is lacking in today’s climate change diplomacy and policy: a sensitivity to the moral and realistic imperatives of *global* justice that encompasses all people everywhere.

A crucial question is, who is obliged to act to address climate change? Henry Shue (1992: 385) argues that justice is fundamentally ‘about not squeezing people for everything one can get out of them, especially when they are already much worse off than oneself. A commitment to justice includes a willingness to choose to accept less good terms than one could have achieved – to accept only agreements that are fair to others as well as to oneself.’ It is well established that states have some obligations to implement climate justice. We can take that as a given, even as states usually fail to live up to those obligations. Many will argue that other actors, notably corporations and perhaps international organisations, also have obligations.⁵ And there is another answer to the question: affluent individuals *everywhere*, even including those living in the poorest countries, are obligated to act. Here we find support from Caney (2005a: 770), who (rather unusually) argues that ‘the burden of dealing with climate change should rest predominantly with the wealthy of the world, by which I mean affluent persons in the world (not affluent countries)’. It is not unusual to say that rich people in economically developed states have obligations, so more will be said about affluent individuals in the developing countries, which is something remarked on quite rarely. The present situation, whereby affluent individuals in poor countries are completely off the hook, directly (as are most people in affluent countries) and indirectly (unlike people in some European states, who must pay more for energy as part of those countries’ early efforts to act on climate change), hardly fits Shue’s conception – and many other conceptions – of justice.

Throughout the book two main critiques and two main proposals are put forward. The first critique is that of the state-centric myopia of the climate change regime. Because the regime is premised on the rights and (less so) the responsibilities of sovereign states, it has resulted in a tragedy of the atmospheric commons and a climate change regime that largely ignores the roles, rights and duties of persons. The second critique is of some new, very important and absolutely essential cosmopolitan interpretations of the climate change problem. These interpretations rightly invoke various forms of global justice as possible remedies for climate change (often moral remedies, but sometimes practical and institutional ones). However, they routinely do what cosmopolitans ought not to do: they discriminate by treating advantaged, capable and affluent people in different countries very differently. In particular, they tend to ignore the real-world causes of climate change – and the moral implications of that reality – by making demands on people in developed countries while not making the same demands on affluent consumers in developing countries. This preoccupation with

people in rich countries creates moral, practical and political problems for addressing climate change.

The two main proposals of the book emanate in large part from the reasons for these two critiques. The first proposal is for moral cosmopolitanism to help overcome the myopia of interstate doctrine. Moral cosmopolitanism puts people first, as should discourse and negotiations on climate change. Related to this, the second proposal is for what is called cosmopolitan diplomacy to overcome the you-go-first mentality of the international climate change negotiations by making global justice, and thus human rights, central to climate diplomacy and a key objective of climate policy. States will remain key actors, but they ought to take on a new role of being facilitators of global citizenship.

The existing system of international environmental governance, like international relations generally, is biased against – and indeed premised upon – *not* placing any obligations directly on people within state boundaries. To do otherwise would tend to violate state sovereignty, or at least the usual conception of it. But our preoccupation with narrow conceptions of international justice diverts attention and action exclusively to the national and interstate levels, when what is needed is simultaneous attention to localised and individual responsibility and action. The current solutions – international agreements – will not do enough to address, fundamentally, the current global trajectory of greenhouse gases. Without very substantial changes in behaviour at the personal level, climate change will probably be exacerbated. To be sure, these changes in behaviour are most often required of people in developed states, which is consistent with what developing countries have been rightly demanding for a long time. But there will also have to be changes in behaviour among millions of affluent people living outside the developed countries. This is an important message that has been transmitted too rarely so far. The upshot is that by placing persons – and their rights, needs and duties – at the centre of climate diplomacy and discourse, more just, effective and politically viable (and palatable) policies are increasingly likely to be formulated and implemented.

NOTES

1. Throughout the book, the terms 'country', 'nation' and 'state' are normally used synonymously to refer to sovereign states (e.g. Canada, China), while 'the world' normally refers to all humanity.
2. I further develop the political and policy arguments in Harris (2013).
3. Barry is playing on the title of Al Gore's book, *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006).

4. The affluent also have obligations to act to protect and to aid non-humans and the biosphere, but that is not something that is addressed here (see, e.g., Barkdull and Harris 1998; Midgley 2001).
5. For a taxonomy of who or what should bear these burdens, see Caney (2005a: 754–5).